Commercial Lease Breach Allows Termination and Texas Supremes Want More Detail to Support Attorney Fee Awards

Water seeps up through dialysis clinic's floor. Clinic's repair attempts stop helping. Clinic terminates lease early, moves, and leaves some rent unpaid. Clinic sues the landlord for breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of suitability for use as a clinic, for a declaratory judgment that a casualty occurred in relation to the lease, that the landlord didn't fix it, and that the clinic had the right to terminate the lease. The landlord put forth affirmative defenses including waiver and prior material breach and counterclaimed for negligence and breach of contract. The clinic asserted its own affirmative defenses to the counterclaims.
The jury found that neither party had complied with the lease, that the landlord had breached first, and that the landlord had breached the implied warranty of suitability. Though the clinic had originally sought money, it did not ask the jury for a money verdict and so didn't get one. The trial judge ruled that the clinic had the right to terminate the lease.
The lease provided that in case of a lawsuit that the prevailing party would get reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees from the non-prevailing party. The clinic's lawyer testified that he had 20 years of litigation experience, that his standard rate was $450 per hour, that he had handled cases similar to this before, that a reasonable and necessary number of hours for a case like this would be between 750 and 1,000 hours, which made for a fee between 300 and 400 thousand dollars, but that this particular case cost more. More like $800,000, because his side had had to search through "millions" of emails and review "hundred of thousands" of documents during discovery, that more than 40 depositions were taken, and that there had been a 40-page motion for summary judgment. He said his opinion was based on the amount at issue, the case's complexity, and his knowledge and experience. The clinic got $800,000 for attorneys' fees at trial and additional conditional awards on appeal.
The landlord appealed. The Dallas court of appeals held that the landlord had waived error as to the trial court's allowance of termination of the lease.
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Paul W. Green, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that although the landlord had properly objected to allowing the lease termination, on the merits, termination of a lease was allowable in a case like this. It also ruled that although the clinic might not have been the prevailing party as a plaintiff in the case, because it didn't get any damages from its claim as a plaintiff under the lease-- it got no money, it was prevailing party as a defendant against the landlord's claims. However, the Supremes reversed and remanded the attorneys' fee award on the ground that the testimony in the case was insufficient. It was similar to the lodestar method of determining the attorneys' fees in the case but was not detailed enough to meet that method.
Hat tip to Houston civil appellate attorney Scott Rothenberg.
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, No. 16-006 (Tex. Apr. 26, 2019).

What Can Po' Folk Do about Court Costs and Record Costs on Appeal in Texas State Courts?

Here I'm talking about appeals, not applications for extraordinary writs. Court costs here are filing fees (Some other things are counted by trial courts as court costs, but they generally don't affect the ordinary appeals of poor people.). An appeal is generally decided on the basis of a clerk's record and a reporter's (or recorder's) record. A clerk's record used to be called a transcript in Texas practice and a reporter's record, a statement of facts; you might still hear these terms today, and it helps to know these terms when you're reading old law. A court clerk's job is to keep track of the documents filed, orders entered, and docket entries made in the trial court (These days, they're practically always e-documents.), and, when asked and when paid the fees allowed by law, to prepare an electronic record of them for the use of the parties and the appellate court on appeal. The reporter (practically always using machine shorthand) or recorder (practically always using a special audio recorder) practically always takes down jury selection, opening statements, witness testimony and trial arguments for a record for the appeals court and is also the steward of the trial exhibits.
Indigents, that is, people who cannot afford to pay costs, can ask to be excused from filing fees in trial court and if the trial court agrees that a person was and is indigent at the time rendering civil judgment, those fees will be excused, and if they were excused at trial, unless there is some evidence that the poor person's status has changed, they will be excused from filing fees on appeal. In criminal cases, a defendant can be found indigent at the beginning of the trial proceedings, and, in the absence of new evidence, that finding will hold even through appellate proceedings. Criminal defendants and sexually-violent-predator respondents who are indigent have a right to be represented by lawyers and to get the clerk's record and the reporter's or recorder's record at no expense to them at trial and on initial appeal. Indigent people who may lose their parental rights have a right to appointed counsel and reporter's record on initial appeal.
There are generally not statutes nor rules for appellate indigency record relief for other kinds of prospective appellants in Texas state courts.

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Go into Force Today

Amendments to the federal rules of appellate procedure go into force today. This is a link to the rule changes. The most important changes will be to reducing word counts in briefs.

I feel forced to copy this here, because I don't know how long the Fifth Circuit's guidance about reducing word count and cases in briefing will be on the front of their web site.

Guidance regarding reduced word count and cases in briefing.

Reduced word counts became effective December 1, 2016, pursuant to changes to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. To ensure fairness to parties, for cases in briefing where an appellant filed a brief before December 1, 2016, and an appellee's brief will be due on or after December 1, 2016, the appellee's brief may use the former (greater) word count limitation, if necessary.  As the court continues to consider possible changes with respect to new word count limitations, counsel are invited to review Fifth Circuit Circuit Rule 32.4.

Fifth Circuit miscellaneous fees are going up.

Can't slap attorney's fees on an indigent criminal defendant

Clifton James Taylor was found to be indigent at the beginning of his case and was lucky enough to get Judith Shields, a doughy criminal defense fighter from Conroe. Taylor pleaded guilty to third degree felony assault against a family member and went to the judge for punishment. Among the penalties the judge rendered was attorney's fees. Shields took this up on appeal along with another issue. Justice Leanne Johnson wrote for a panel including Chief Justice Steve McKeithen and Justice Hollis Horton removing the attorney's fees. Credit should be given to the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office for graciously conceding this point before the opinion was rendered.
Taylor was found indigent at the beginning of the trial court case. No one alleged that his indigent condition had changed during the course of the proceedings so the law of the case at the end of the trial was that he was indigent, and that therefore charging his attorney's fees was inappropriate.
Criminal defense lawyers, check for this in your judgments and know at least one case to cite before your trial judge and the State.
Taylor v. State, No. 09-14-00039-CR  (Tex. App.-- Beaumont Jan. 28, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) available at http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=9cfac722-1afc-4640-854d-3e4affb5a49d&MediaID=f537d09f-36e3-4448-8e1c-55ee9a0921b3&coa=%22%20+%20this.CurrentWebState.CurrentCourt%20+%20@%22&DT=Opinion

Can't Charge a Stone Broke Defendant Attorneys' Fees

After having been convicted of two count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, Ruben Ramirez had two complaints:

1. that the evidence in his case should have been suppressed and
2. that he should not have been charged fees for the lawyer appointed for him as a indigent.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio disposed of the first complaint quickly-- no reason to suppress drugs from a place Ramirez

1. didn't have a possessory interest in,
2. didn't have a right to be in,
3. didn't control and have the right to keep other people out of,
4. didn't take any normal precautions to protect his privacy,
5. didn't put to any private use, and 
6. didn't have a claim of privacy consistent with historical notions of privacy.

The second claim seemed a little harder. Ramirez filed an affidavit of indigency-- a pauper's oath-- at trial. There never was a finding that he his status changed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 25.06(g) says that attorneys' fees may only be charged to a person who has some capacity to pay, which is not Ramirez.

Justice Marialyn Barnard, writing for a panel that also included Chief Justice Catherine Stone and Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, affirmed the trial court's judgment after modifying by getting rid of the attorneys' fee judgment.

Ruben Ramirez v. State of Texas, Nos. 4-13-00384-CR and 4-13-00387-CR (Tex. App.-- San Antonio, no pet. h., Mar. 12, 2014).