Under Texas law, a person convicted of a sex crime or sexually motivated murder, who has a behavioral abnormality: a paraphilia, a sexual weirdness, can be civilly committed and held interminably. The State was unsuccessful in committing the first person it tried to commit. After that, though, every respondent was either committed or there was a hung jury, and on retrial the person was committed. In the first few years, I knew of one case that had been reversed and remanded. That was the only one , except for one case that got sent to the Corpus Christi court of appeals instead of Beaumont's and was judged by a visiting justice instead of a regular justice (and which was reversed in favor of the trial court by the Texas Supremes). Other than that,
the appeals court always affirmed.
Last March I wrote about a string of reversals of the SVP trial court in Conroe by the Beaumont COA. There was another reversal in May that I wrote of here.
Now there's another--In re Commitment of James Anthony Miller, No. 09-11-00450-CV (Tex. App.--Beaumont (July 26, 2012, no pet. h.) The trial judge appears to have been Michael Seiler. After the State and the defense had each taken a turn at questioning the panel from which the jury would be selected, the defense wanted to ask either: (1) “Can you set aside any bias if you find there’s an offense against a child? Can you listen to all the evidence and follow the law?” or (2) “Is anyone unable to hear topics about children? Can you listen to the evidence and follow the law?” The trial court refused Miller’s request to pose such questions to the jury panel.
Chief Justice McKeithen joined by Justice Charles Kreger held that a trial court’s refusal to allow proper questions during voir dire denies a party’s constitutional right to trial by a fair and impartial jury and is harmful, i.e., probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, following In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) and Babcock v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1989). The third panelist, Justice David Gaultney, argued in dissent that the trial judge was in his sound discretion not to allow additional questions after voir dire had been closed once, and that there was no indication that the trial judge's failure to allow the question or questions caused any biased veniremember to get on the jury. That is, the trial judge's action was either not error or was harmless error.
Texas lawyer Bob Mabry kept you up with legal writing and also with appeals courts, particularly Texas's Court of Criminal Appeals and Beaumont Texas's Ninth Court of Appeals.
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- Bob Mabry
- Civil appellate, criminal appellate, and criminal trial lawyer at 704 North Thompson Street, #157, Conroe, Texas 77301-2578, (936) 494-1393.
Showing posts with label Michael Seiler. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Michael Seiler. Show all posts
Thursday, August 2, 2012
Friday, May 4, 2012
Another Reversal for SVP Cases; Gaultney Dissents
The case is In re Commitment of Mohammad Reza Kalati. This is the fifth in the recent series of reversals of the sexually violent predator trial court, although this time the trial judge being reversed is not Michael Seiler, but Putnam Kaye Reiter. The appellate court for SVP matters is the Ninth Supreme Judicial District Court of Beaumont. As has been written in this blog before and in the Montgomery County Courier, Beaumont's Ninth Court has been holding that the SVP trial judges have been overly restrictive of the defense in this kind of cases.
There's another surprise here, though, beside the difference in trial judges. Justice David Gaultney, a scholarly and independent-minded jurist, usually a little more open to defense arguments than his fellows on the Beaumont Court, dissented.
In jury selection, the defense asked the venire panel, the group of people from which the jury would be selected, if they could be fair to a person an expert had diagnosed as a pedophile. The prosecution objected that the question was a commitment question, a question seeking to bind one or more jurors to a particular position before the juror had been given the evidence, and also that it made reference to a specific diagnosis. The trial judge sustained the objection. Justice Hollis Horton, writing for himself and Chief Justice Steve McKeithen, overruled the objection and granted Kalati a new trial. They felt bound by In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. 2011).
Justice Gaultney dissented. He said that the question of the effect of a specific diagnosis might be objectionable, an inquiry into the weight that a panelist would give a specific piece of evidence, and the trial judge was never offered a clearly unobjectionable question.
Some observations: I don't hear any request for or implication of commitment in the defense's question. It's not weird for the petitioner to complain that the error as to specific diagnosis is not properly preserved, but I don't see that unclarity there undoes the improper sustaining of the commitment question.
I like how the Beaumont Court just attached the dissent to the end of the majority opinion, less work for the clerk and more convenient for the reader.
I made a mistake earlier today. I thought that this was a fifth reversal for Judge Seiler, but my friend and old colleague Brian Lacour, second chair for the defense at trial, corrected me.
There's another surprise here, though, beside the difference in trial judges. Justice David Gaultney, a scholarly and independent-minded jurist, usually a little more open to defense arguments than his fellows on the Beaumont Court, dissented.
In jury selection, the defense asked the venire panel, the group of people from which the jury would be selected, if they could be fair to a person an expert had diagnosed as a pedophile. The prosecution objected that the question was a commitment question, a question seeking to bind one or more jurors to a particular position before the juror had been given the evidence, and also that it made reference to a specific diagnosis. The trial judge sustained the objection. Justice Hollis Horton, writing for himself and Chief Justice Steve McKeithen, overruled the objection and granted Kalati a new trial. They felt bound by In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. 2011).
Justice Gaultney dissented. He said that the question of the effect of a specific diagnosis might be objectionable, an inquiry into the weight that a panelist would give a specific piece of evidence, and the trial judge was never offered a clearly unobjectionable question.
Some observations: I don't hear any request for or implication of commitment in the defense's question. It's not weird for the petitioner to complain that the error as to specific diagnosis is not properly preserved, but I don't see that unclarity there undoes the improper sustaining of the commitment question.
I like how the Beaumont Court just attached the dissent to the end of the majority opinion, less work for the clerk and more convenient for the reader.
I made a mistake earlier today. I thought that this was a fifth reversal for Judge Seiler, but my friend and old colleague Brian Lacour, second chair for the defense at trial, corrected me.
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
How and When to Challenge the Admissibility of an Expert's Opinion at Trial
An extremely good blog post on how to impeach an expert witness of the kind most lawyers will encounter- the somewhat credentialed person who no longer is fully engaged in his or her field, but whose business is, generally, limited to testifying at trials is here.
They don't talk about the appellate angle in attacking experts. Professional testifiers are often persuasive to juries and trial judges, but are much less impressive when judged on a cold record. I practice in southeast Texas. In the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals and in the Texas Supreme Court a personal injury plaintiff's expert is guilty until proven innocent, so defense counsel in such a case should practically always make a Daubert/Robinson challenge to the adversary's expert. In a sexually-violent-predator civil-commitment case, Judge Seiler will be very open to an attack on the defense expert, less so for his appellate court, the Ninth, in Beaumont, as I've written about elsewhere on this blog.
They don't talk about the appellate angle in attacking experts. Professional testifiers are often persuasive to juries and trial judges, but are much less impressive when judged on a cold record. I practice in southeast Texas. In the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals and in the Texas Supreme Court a personal injury plaintiff's expert is guilty until proven innocent, so defense counsel in such a case should practically always make a Daubert/Robinson challenge to the adversary's expert. In a sexually-violent-predator civil-commitment case, Judge Seiler will be very open to an attack on the defense expert, less so for his appellate court, the Ninth, in Beaumont, as I've written about elsewhere on this blog.
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
A Phone Call from a Southern Gentleman
Ninth Court of Appeals Justice Hollis Horton called today. In our wide-ranging conversation, he was curious about some of the background of the sexually-violent-predator civil-commitment system that he didn't have interaction with in his part of the process. He was surprised by the relative inexperience of lawyers working on both sides of the SVP docket. He said that he had not seen the 48 Hours piece on the best known SVP trial, that of Wesley Miller (I was Miller's trial counsel.). Justice Horton said that he had visited this blog, looking at the post about Judge Seiler's reversals (It's the second one below here.), and he and I agreed that we valued the work of Nancy Flake, Managing Editor of the Montgomery County Courier. His undergraduate degree, he told me, was in economics. He said he had to get off the phone because of the Beaumont courthouse shooting.
Friday, March 9, 2012
On the Reversals of Sexual Violent Predator Commitments
In
In
re Commitment of David Dodson, the 435th District Court of
Montgomery County, Texas struck the testimony of Dr. Anna Shursen, Dodson’s only
witness, after she had begun to testify. In only the second reversal I am familiar
with of a sexually-violent-predator trial on the merits by the Ninth Appeals Court of Beaumont, it overturned
Dodson’s commitment. It appears from the filing number of the
case of the commitment of Michael Bohannon that Bohannon’s case was likely
tried later than Dodson’s. The district court in that case also struck Dr.
Shursen’s testimony—again she was the defense’s only witness—but it struck her
this time after a pretrial hearing, before the beginning of the trial. Nine
days after Beaumont had reversed Dodson,
Beaumont reversed Bohannon. The State
appealed, and Bohannon is currently pending before the Texas
Supreme Court. The
Texas Supremes heard oral argument in Bohannon
November 8, 2011.
In re Commitment of Raymond Scott Hinkle appears to have been tried after Bohannon. The State called Hinkle's designated expert psychiatrist Dr. Charles Tennison as a hostile witness in its case-in-chief. Hinkle reserved his questions of his expert for his case-in-chief. The trial court struck Tennison as a expert after his adverse questioning by the State. Beaumont reversed and remanded the commitment.
In re Commitment of Larry White looks like it was next in line, but it's not a reversal. His appellate lawyer told Beaumont that there weren't any grounds for reversal. The trial court struck Tennison here, too.
Yesterday,
In
re Commitment of Lester Winkle came down. The trial court had stricken Tennison—again, the defense’s sole expert—in a pretrial
hearing. The appellate court panel in the case was made up of Justices David
Gaultney, Charles Kreger, and Hollis Horton. Gaultney dissented on the ground,
basically, that the defense had not preserved the error in the trial court by
not requesting a continuance or asking for another expert evaluation, after the
trial court had stricken the expert’s testimony there.
Observations:
- Four reversals out of 103 trials is not a lot. The newspaper story about Judge Seiler's record would make an uninformed person think that he's reversed a lot, which is not the case.
- I'm not aware of the trial court ever striking a State's expert witness in an SVP case. I'm not aware that Beaumont has ever overruled a trial court for admitting a State's expert's testimony over objection in an SVP case, even though, I don't believe that the State's expert witnesses in SVP cases are any better than plaintiff's expert witnesses in personal injury cases who are routinely struck by trial and appellate courts (SVP case are civil cases, as personal injury cases are.).
- Beaumont appears to me to be signalling Judge Seiler that he should be slower to strike defense witnesses in SVP cases, and it is not clear to me that Judge Seiler is listening to them.
- State Counsel for Offenders, the agency of the Texas Criminal Justice board that is the public defender office for SVP cases, does not have as much money for expert witnesses as the prosecutors do. The State always has at least one psychiatrist expert, but because SCFO does have as much money, respondents are much less likely to have a psychiatrist in the battle of the experts.
- Larry White needs to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus directly.
- Trial lawyers: if your only expert witness gets struck, ask for a continuance, and ask for leave to seek another expert.
- Notwithstanding my observation number number one above, Nancy Flake's article in the Montgomery County Courier was a fine piece of journalism. The subject was recondite and the deadline came quickly, but she appears to have gotten the facts right.
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