Badass Brett Busby Comes to the Supreme Court of Texas

Governor Greg Abbott appointed Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals Justice Brett Busby in February 2019, and Busby was confirmed by the Texas Senate in March 2019. He had had about six years of experience on the Houston bench. He is presently the Chair of the State Bar of Texas Appellate Section and was formerly an adjunct professor at the University of Texas Law School, where he taught the U.S. Supreme Court Litigation Clinic.

Justice Busby clerked at the U.S. Supreme Court for Justice John Paul Stevens and also for retired Justice Byron R. White. He argued one case and briefed many others before the U.S. Supremes.. He also handled dozens of  Supreme Court of Texas appeals and the federal and Texas appellate courts while in private practice. He is Board Certified in Civil Appellate Law. He also clerked for Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

He grew up in Amarillo and Austin. He graduated with high honors from Duke University and Columbia Law School. 

He has chaired the Texas Access to Justice Commission’s Rules and Legislation Committee and also served on the Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee. He also has been Chair of the State Bar Committee on Pattern Jury Charges for th Business, Consumer, Insurance, and Employment Volume. He is an elected member of the American Law Institute and writes and speaks frequently at continuing legal education conferences.

A life-long violinist, he is a member of the Houston Symphony Board. He is chair of its Artistic Affairs Committee and he previously chaired the Music Director Selection Committee. He plays in the first violin section of the Houston Civic Symphony and has served on the boards of the Post Oak School and the Foundation for Jones Hall.

Justice Busby is married. His wife is named Erin. He met her while clerking at the U.S. Supreme Court. They have two children.

Finality in Federal District Judgments for Purposes of Appeal: the General Rule

Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction of final U.S. district court judgments except where a decision may be directly reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.  SCOTUS said, in Hall v. Hall, No. 16-1150, Mar. 27, 2018, which I have cleaned up: "A final decision ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. The archetypal final decision is one that triggers the entry of judgment. Appeal from such a final decision is a matter of right. Under §1291, any litigant armed with a final judgment from a lower federal court is entitled to take an appeal, which generally must be filed within 30 days."

Former Justice of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals Greg Perkes Appointed to Chief Justice Dori Contreras's Old Seat There

Greg Perkes who had been on Texas's Thirteenth Court of Appeals from 2011 to 2016 was appointed Monday to fill the seat of Dori Contreras who had been raised from there by her election as Chief Justice. Justice Perkes will sit with the Edinburg panel- a red spot in the blue, blue expanses of the 20 counties of the Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District. Contreras had a year left on her old term. Love the tie.

Counting Days in the State Appellate Courts of the Lone Star State

In Texas state appellate law, you calculate deadlines by counting the first day after a triggering event happens up until the last day of a period that is not a holiday, a Saturday or a Sunday. For example, the deadline to file a notice of appeal of a final criminal trial court judgment signed Wednesday, January 2, 2019, in which no motion for new trial nor motion in arrest of judgment was filed would be Friday, February 1, 2019. The time to file an appeal in such a case would be 30 days. The first day of the thirty would be Thursday, January 3, 2019, and the 30th day would be Friday, February 1, 2019. Barring a technical efiling problem, the notice would be late on or after midnight Saturday, February 2, 2019.

Let's try the hypothetical again, only this time let's have the judgment be signed Thursday, January 3. The first day to count would be Friday, January 4 and the 30th day would now be Saturday, February 2, 2019. Since the 30th day is now a Saturday, the period does not end but would go on to the next day which would be Sunday, February 3, 2019, which does not end the period and the deadline is moved yet one more day to Monday, February 4, 2019. Again, barring a technical efiling problem, the notice would be late on or after midnight Tuesday, February 5, 2019.

For a third time, the judgment is signed in Montgomery County on Thursday, January 17, 2019. The first day is Friday, January 19, 2019. The 30th day is Saturday, February 16, 2019- no good. The next day Sunday the 17th is no better. In this case, though, Monday the 18th is President's Day, a holiday in Jefferson County where the appropriate court of appeals sits, Beaumont's Ninth Court of Appeals. So it is no good either and the last day for filing the notice of appeal is Tuesday, February 19, 2019. Efiling willing, the notice would be late Wednesday, February 20, 2019, at or after midnight. Texas state appeals courts are pretty good about announcing their holidays. If the appellate court has not indicated on its web page whether or not a day is a holiday a good practical rule is that courts of appeals follow the holidays of the county in which they usually sit, and the highest state courts follow the state government holiday schedule. Parties with their backs against the wall may try to get, say, a state holiday counted when an appeals court was open. I shudder to think what would happen if the holidays of Nueces County, one home of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, did not match with the holidays of Hidalgo County, the other home of the Thirteenth. Those are the nightmares of appellate nerds.

In Texas, Sometimes the Cops Can Hunt You Down with Your Cell Phone without a Warrant.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Barbara Hervey held that evidence suppression is not a remedy for a violation of the federal Stored Communications Act or Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 18.21 notwithstanding Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23, and, additionally, that no warrant is required to access a limited amount of real-time cell-site information from a defendant's wireless carrier.
Christian Vernon Sims, pictured above courtesy of The Paris News, was a suspect in his grandmother's murder. The grandmother's credit card had been used 80 miles north of the crime scene. A sheriff's deputy who was the investigating officer in the shooting returned to his office to seek a warrant for the cell phone information. It was a Thursday; it was before the close of business hours. A sheriff's deputy requested that Sims's phone be pinged without a warrant on an emergency basis. That deputy reported that 20 minutes passed before he got real-time information as to where Sims's phone was. The sheriff's office figured out what road Sims was taking, and local police forces along that road narrowed down where he was to a motel where he was arrested without incident. He moved to have the phone information suppressed, which the trial court denied, and he ended up pleading to a 35-year sentence, but with the right to carry the motion to suppress up on appeal. The Sixth Court of Appeals in Texarkana affirmed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted a petition for discretionary review.
The federal Stored Communications Act provides that its civil remedies are the only sanctions for a nonconstitutional violation of it. Neither the COA opinion nor the CCA opinion note that under Article Six, paragraph two of the United States Constitution, federal law trumps any state law at all-- even a state's constitution. So suppression on the basis of the Stored Communications Act was always a nonstarter.
The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that Article 18.21 was made law after Article 38.23 and, so, supersedes it. Article 18.21 has been moved to chapter 18B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This case was, of course, under the old law.
Though the United States Supreme Court case of Carpenter v. United States found that Carpenter's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the United States by its looking at 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average of 101 data points per day without a warrant based on probable cause. It said its ruling had nothing to do real-time information as in Sims's case and opines that exigent circumstances might arise in the case of a fleeing suspect as here. The CCA held, therefore, that Sims's case was not on all fours with Carpenter.
This case was wrongly decided. There was not any exigency excusing the lack of a warrant. The suspect was already at least 80 miles away. He was 16 years old and had killed his grandmother-- no reason to think that he was a great danger to others. He was driving in a car and was going to have to sleep. The record is clear that law enforcement could have a gotten a warrant. The court just did not want to rule in favor of a granny-killer.
To be fair to my friends in law enforcement, any prudent Texas agency is going to implement procedures to get a warrant in situations like this. It is a best practice and keeps the appellate prosecutors from having to go one or more extra rounds in a future case. 

Appealing from Some of Texas's Lowest Trial Courts- Justice Courts

The number of justices of the peace in the 254 counties of Texas varies greatly. 134-souled Loving County has only one. Justices of the Peace need not be attorneys. The largest county, Harris County, with county seat Houston, has eight justice of the peace precincts with two justices for each precinct. The Texas Constitution grants justice courts original jurisdiction of the trial of fine-only criminal offenses and exclusive jurisdiction of civil matters in which the amount in controversy is less than $200 and whatever other jurisdiction is additionally granted by law.

The highest elected official in any Texas county is the county judge. Early in Texas history, a county judge was a person of all work who presided over the work of a commissioners' court of four elected officials-- commissioners-- each of whom was responsible for a quarter of the county's land area. The judge and the commissioners managed the county's finances together, and additionally, a county judge presided over a county trial court ruling on misdemeanors, small civil matters, and probate matters. Now County Judges in large counties do not hold that latter court, but delegate that work to one or more county-courts-at-law created by the legislature. Additionally, large counties have dedicated probate courts, created by the legislature.   Whether or not a county judge holds a law court, such a judge, like a justice of the peace, need not be an attorney. County-court-at-law and probate judges do have to be attorneys as district court judges must.

"Bob, this is all fascinating, but what does it have to do with appellate law?" With a few exceptions-- always read the statute creating the court you are appearing in-- the rule about appealing judgments in these courts is that you have a right to a de novo trial in a court presided over by a lawyer judge. Usually, you go from a justice court to a county-court-at-law. You post a bond a day or less after the justice court proceeding and you get a de novo trial-- a trial "of newness"-- a do-over, the only disadvantage that the loser of the first trial bears is that the appeal bond will pay off the winner below if the bond filer loses. In civil matters, the judgment of the trial de novo can often be appealed to a court of appeals like any other civil case heard by the county-court-at-law. In a criminal matter, only federal or state constitutional matters may be taken up to a court of appeals.

In Plea Bargaining Down to a Lesser Included Offense, Does a Defendant Waive Absolutely All Possible Punishment Error of Any Kind?

A Texas state prosecutor charges a defendant with specific crimes which have certain punishments associated with them. The most common type of plea bargaining is for the State to try to get the defendant to agree to the most punishment possible and for the defendant to try to get the State to agree to the least punishment possible. When the two parties agree as to such a matter and they can get the judge to approve it, then the defendant is stuck with having pleaded guilty and that State is stuck with a particular minimum punishment, and neither side can appeal.
But, as Texas Ninth Court of Appeals Justice Leanne Johnson writes for a panel including Chief Justice Steve McKeithen and Justice Hollis Horton, there is another type of plea bargaining which can be done along with or instead of the other type, which is plea bargaining about which crime should be charged.  Roberto Ishmael Alvarado was charged with capital murder but reached a plea bargain agreement with the Liberty County District Attorney's Office to only be charged with the lesser-included offense of murder. At that time in the process, the trial judge ruled that Alvarado did not have a right to appeal. This makes sense; the part of the process that determined what crime, if any, Alvarado had committed had been determined by an ordinarily unappealable plea bargain. Texas criminal cases have two parts, though, (1) guilt-innocence and (2) punishment. The State and Alvarado did not agree as to what the punishment should be, and the State allowed Alvarado to go to trial under the lesser-included offense only. The Liberty trial jury popped Alvarado hard-- a 60-year sentence plus a $10,000 fine. The trial judge noted in the sentencing paperwork that the sentence was not entered into pursuant to a plea bargain-- Alvarado had gone to trial so that he, Alvarado, had a right to appeal his punishment. The Nines said here that the trial judge was wrong as to the punishment. Alvarado's plea bargain as to the charge had the effect, they said of limiting his punishment so that the punishment determination had also been reached pursuant to a plea bargain, so that Alvarado, in fact, had no right to appeal.
When a defendant pleads guilty to an offense as part of a plea bargain, that defendant cannot appeal that the defendant is not guilty of that offense, and bears the risk of being mistaken as to culpability for that particular offense. When a defendant agrees to accept a particular punishment, a defendant bears the risk that the prosecutor or the trial judge might make a reversible error in the punishment phase of his or her trial. The prosecutor or the trial judge might have made such a mistake, but the defendant gives up the right to be tried and to find out if reversible error manifests itself.
Even if the defendant agrees to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the State can still prevent the defendant from waiving jury trial as to that lesser offense. Plea bargains are governed in part by the law of contracts. The course of dealing of the parties indicates that the State and the trial judge accepted that the defendant, in trading his right to contest guilt-innocence as to a lesser offense for not having to defend the greater charge, had not agreed to accept maximum punishment as to that lesser offense. There does not appear to be any legal nor policy reason for the court of appeals not to get to the merits of the unbargained-for part of the case. If the Court of Appeals does not think better of this decision on reconsideration, it should be taken up to the Court of Criminal Appeals to see if prosecutors and trial courts don't have the power to make deals like this.